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ABSTRACT
3D steganography is used in order to embed or hide informa-
tion into 3D objects without causing visible or machine de-
tectable modifications. In this paper we rethink about a high
capacity 3D steganography based on the Hamiltonian path
quantization, and increase its resistance to steganalysis. We
analyze the parameters that may influence the distortion of a
3D shape as well as the resistance of the steganography to
3D steganalysis. According to the experimental results, the
proposed high capacity 3D steganographic method has an in-
creased resistance to steganalysis.
Index Terms— 3D steganography, steganalysis, shape
distortion, information hiding
1. INTRODUCTION
3D objects are playing a key role in many popular and cutting-
edge technologies, such as virtual reality and 3D printing.
Crypto-security applications of 3D objects and graphics are
increasingly important given the large diversity of ways for
generating 3D objects, either by using software or 3D scan-
ning and given their ubiquitous usage in many applications.
Information hiding, including watermarking and steganogra-
phy, is the technique that can conceal the information in the
digital files without causing noticeable changes to the carri-
ers. The 3D information hiding started in the late 90s [1],
when artists and 3D graphics designers wanted to enforce
their copyright. Since then, various 3D information hiding
methods have been proposed [2, 3, 4, 5].
High capacity 3D steganography, such as the method from
[6], which can embed a payload of 10 Bits Per Vertex (BPV),
have been proposed lately. Inspired by [7], Itier et al. [8]
proposed a 3D steganographic method which hides informa-
tion following the Hamiltonian path of the 3D point cloud
resulting in 3 BPV. Subsequently, Itier et al. [9] improved the
capacity of the steganography in [8] to 24 BPV and used the
static arithmetic coding during embedding.
Nevertheless, the resistance of 3D steganography to ste-
ganalysis has not been considered when designing informa-
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tion hiding algorithms. Few papers have discussed so far the
challenges in 3D steganalysis [10, 11, 12]. In this paper, we
rethink about the high capacity 3D steganography proposed
in [9] in the view of enhancing its resistance to steganalysis.
We analyze the influence of the parameters in the algorithm
on the steganlytic features, as well as that of the domain used
for embedding, while attempting to increase the steganogra-
phy’s resistance to steganalysis. Experiments are carried out
to evaluate the proposed methodology. Section 2 describes
the details of the high capacity 3D steganography proposed in
[9]. A brief introduction of 3D steganalysis is given in Section
3. Section 4 presents the proposed 3D embedding approach
while increasing the resistance to steganalysis. The experi-
mental results are described in Section 5 and the conclusion
is provided in Section 6.
2. HIGH CAPACITY 3D STEGANOGRAPHY
The high capacity 3D steganographic algorithm proposed in
[9] utilizes a synchronization technique to guarantee that the
order of the embedded data is the same during the embedding
and extraction stages. Unlike the steganography for digital
images, where the synchronization is based on the existing
sequential order of the pixels in the image, there is no such
evident sequence for vertices of 3D objects.
The steganographic method from [9] builds the Hamilto-
nian path over the complete graph of the vertices in the 3D ob-
ject without using the connectivity information. The Hamil-
tonian path is a unique traversal of all the vertices in the 3D
object, starting from a vertex v0 chosen by a secret key. For
each step, the algorithm chooses the nearest neighbor vi+1 of
the current vertex vi. Finally, a Hamiltonian path Pn is gen-
erated. It is noted that there is a chance that some of the edges
in the path Pn may not exist initially in the mesh. In fact,
the data is hidden whilst simultaneously ensuring its synchro-
nization with the embedded bit order. The message is embed-
ded by changing the relative position of a vertex vi+1 to its
predecessor vi once the vertex vi+1 is added to the Hamil-
tonian path Pn. In order to embed a high bit capacity, the
vertex is displaced along three coordinates in the Spherical
Coordinate System (SCS) which originates in the location of
the vertex’s predecessor. In addition, the algorithm partitions
the edge vector into intervals for each coordinate, controlled
by the parameter ∆. An interval is subdivided into s sub-
intervals which correspond to different words. The vertex is
then moved to the new sub-interval within the interval to em-
bed the corresponding word. The new position of the vertex
is converted back to the Cartesian coordinate system after the
embedding.
The division into sub-intervals can be done by using ei-
ther a uniform or a non-uniform distribution. When consid-
ering the uniform distribution, every sub-interval is of the
same length. Meanwhile, for the non-uniform distribution,
the lengths of the sub-intervals are determined by the prob-
ability of the occurrence of the corresponding words in the
whole secret message, which is coded by the Static Arith-
metic Coding.
In order to prevent the displacement of the vertices chang-
ing the existing Hamiltonian path and to preserve the syn-
chronization of the bit embedding process, a checking stage
is used during the information hiding stage. During the ex-
traction, the Hamiltonian path is built by knowing the starting
vertex v0 and the information is extracted bit-by-bit by de-
tecting the sub-interval where each vertex lies, based on the
knowledge of ∆.
3. 3D STEGANALYSIS
In the study from [9], the distortion of the meshes caused by
the embedding is analyzed by the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ra-
tio (PSNR) [6] and the Mesh Structural Distortion Measure
(MSDM2) [13] which is better correlated with human per-
ception. However, the steganography’s resistance to the 3D
steganalysis was not considered in [9]. The existing image
steganalytic methodology [14, 15] cannot be applied to 3D
meshes, because unlike 3D objects, images are represented
on regular lattices. The first 3D steganalytic algorithm was
proposed in [10]. Then, an improved approach using local
feature set for 3D steganalysis was developed by Li and Bors
[11]. Both these 3D steganalytic approaches are using the
statistics of local 3D features as inputs to machine learning
method algorithms which train the steganalyzer for differen-
tiating the cover and stego 3D objects.
Information embedding in 3D objects only change very
slightly the mesh surface. According to the studies from [10,
11], statistics of localized 3D features can be successfully
used for 3D steganalysis. A 52-dimensional feature vector
was proposed for 3D steganalysis in [11]. Before extracting
the features, Laplacian smoothing is applied to the meshes of
both cover-objects and stego-objects. The features are then
extracted from the original and smoothed meshes. Then, the
first four moments, representing the mean, variance, skew-
ness and kurtosis, of the difference between the geometrical
information of the original and smoothed meshes are used as
inputs for the steganalyzer. The 3D features considered for
steganalysis in [11], include the following: the vertex posi-
tion and norm in the Cartesian coordinate system; the vertex
position and norm in the Laplacian coordinate system [16];
the face normal; the dihedral angle of two neighboring faces;
the vertex normal; the Gaussian curvature and curvature ratio.
4. INCREASING THE RESISTANCE OF 3D
STEGANOGRAPHY TO STEGANALYSIS
In this section, we describe a 3D steganographic method
which increases the resistance of the 3D steganography [9]
to steganalysis. This investigation includes three aspects: the
interval parameter∆, a different selection of the sub-intervals
s and a different embedding style in SCS.
In the following we analyze the displacement of a vertex
vi in the context of increasing the resistance to steganalysis.
The embedding is applied in the spherical coordinate system,
which is illustrated in Figure 1 (a). We consider the displace-
ment of the vertex along the radial coordinate. Assuming that
the sub-intervals are characterised by uniform distributions,
then the displacement of the vertex in the radial coordinate is
defined as
Dρ =
s∑
j=1
s∑
k=1
PjQk|j − k|
∆
s
, (1)
where Pj is the probability of the vertex vi positioned in the
j-th sub-interval, Qk is the probability of the modified po-
sition of the vertex vi being in the k-th sub-interval, and
∆
s
is the length of each sub-interval. We assume that the ver-
tex vi is randomly located in the interval, so that Pj =
1
s
,
j = 1, 2, . . . , s. If the word in the message is uniformly
distributed, the modified position of the vertex vi is accord-
ingly located randomly in the interval, and Qk =
1
s
, k =
1, 2, . . . , s. So equation (1) is simplified as:
Dρ =
∆
3
(
1−
1
s2
)
. (2)
The equations calculating the displacement of the vertex in
the two angle coordinates of SCS are similar to equation (2).
It can be inferred from equation (2) that if the interval pa-
rameter ∆ is decreased, then the displacement of the vertex
will be reduced as well. At the same time, when the number
of sub-intervals s increases, increasing the embedding capac-
ity, the displacement would increase as well. However, the
influence of the number of sub-intervals on the displacement
is very small, because dDρ/ds = 2∆/3s
3 is very small when
s is large. According to this analysis, it is worthwhile to make
the interval parameter∆ as small as possible in order to limit
the effect of the distortions, produced by the information em-
bedding, on those features used for steganalysis.
In the following we analyze the influence of the distor-
tion produced by the information embedding on the features
used for 3D steganalysis. The original version of the HPQ
steganography [9] embeds in all three coordinates of the edge
vector in SCS. However, changes in the two angle coordinates
yx
z
M
T
r
iv
1iv 
(a)
A
B
C
D
E
Bc
(4)fN
(3)fN
(2)fN
(1)fN
ABD
r
(b)
Fig. 1. Illustration of the embedding changes in SCS. (a) The
edge vector −−−→vivi+1 represented in SCS as (r, θ, ϕ). (b) The
changes produced by HPQ in the radial coordinate of the edge
vector in SCS.
of SCS, θ and ϕ , may provide a more significant influence on
the steganalytic features than changes in the radial coordinate,
r.
Figure 1 (b) illustrates how the change produced by the in-
formation embedding is only applied in the radial coordinate
of the edge vector
−−→
AB between the vertices A and B. The
new position of the vertex B is B′, which is not moved from
the direction of the edge
−−→
AB. The face normals of the faces
△ABD and △ABE,
−→
Nf(1) and
−→
Nf(2), are not affected by
the displacement of the vertexB. The dihedral angle between
the faces △ABD and △ABE, which is shown in Figure 1
(b), is:
αAB = arccos
−→
Nf(1) ·
−→
Nf(2)
|
−→
Nf(1)||
−→
Nf(2)|
. (3)
The dihedral angle αAB is not influenced by the modification
of the vertex B either. However, the displacement of the ver-
tex B changes the direction of the face normals
−→
Nf(3) and
−→
Nf(4), except when all the faces are on the same flat surface.
In practice, lots of flat regions exist in Computer Aided De-
sign 3D objects. Smooth regions look locally flat in 3D ob-
jects of high resolution. Consequently, the subsequent edge
vector is only slightly affected by the displacement from its
predecessor edge.
It can be observed that any modification of the edge vector
−−→
AB in any of the two angle coordinates of SCS, would result
in changes in the face normals
−→
Nf(1),
−→
Nf(2) and in the dihe-
dral angle αAB . Such features are used for steganalysis and
their modifications would be identified by the steganalyzer.
According to this analysis, the 3D embedding’s resistance
to steganalysis is improved when modifying only the radial
component of a edge vector’s representation in SCS. How-
ever, the edges used by the steganography are generated dur-
ing the construction of the Hamiltonian path, and some of
them may actually not exist in the original mesh. Neverthe-
less, the overlap between the edges of the original mesh and
those in the Hamiltonian path is quite high, so eventually this
issue does not significantly influence the steganalysis result.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we test the proposed 3D steganography’s re-
sistance to steganalysis. In the experiments, we use 354 cover
3D objects from the Princeton Mesh Segmentation project
[17] database. Then, we set different values for the param-
eters in the high capacity 3D steganography [9] based on the
Hamiltonian Path Quantization (HPQ), and embed the infor-
mation as described in Section 4. The steganalytic features
used for training the steganalyzers are the 52-dimensional Lo-
cal Feature Set (LFS52) proposed in [11]. For each setting of
the information algorithm, a steganalyzer is trained over 260
pairs of cover and their corresponding stego objects and tested
over the other 94 pairs. The machine learning method that we
used to train the steganalyzers is the Fisher Linear Discrimi-
nate (FLD) ensemble [18], which is the most popular method
used in the field of steganalysis. The training and testing sets
are independently split for 30 times, and the median value
of the detection errors is considered as the final result. The
detection error ratio is the sum of the false alarms and miss
detections divided by the size of the testing set.
In order to observe the influence of the interval param-
eter ∆ on the resistance of the 3D steganography based
on HPQ [9] to steganalysis, we set the values of ∆ ∈
{10−4, 10−5, 10−6, 10−7}. The embedding domains are the
three coordinates of SCS. The payload rate is 24 BPV, con-
sisting of 8 BPV for each coordinate of SCS, which means
that the number of sub-intervals is s = 28. The final results
of the detection errors for the steganalysis of the HPQ based
steganography with different values for the interval parame-
ter ∆ are provided in Figure 2. These results indicate that a
smaller value of the interval parameter ∆ leads to a higher
detection error, corresponding to higher resistance to ste-
ganalysis. In the case when ∆ = 10−4, the interval becomes
too large to find enough available edges for embedding, so
the actual payload is less than 24 BPV, which explains why
the detection error goes up.
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Fig. 2. Detection errors for the steganalysis of the high ca-
pacity 3D steganography HPQ [9] when varying the interval
parameter ∆.
Table 1. Median values and the standard deviations of the detection errors for the steganalysis of the 3D steganography (HPQ)
[9] and its variants, ∆ = 10−7.
HPQ (24 BPV) HPQ-PA (8 BPV) HPQ-R (8 BPV) HPQ-R (24 BPV)
LFS52 0.1888 (±.0253) 0.2553 (±.0242) 0.3112 (±.0259) 0.3085 (±.0246)
Dihedral Angle 0.1866 (±.0174) 0.3431 (±.0222) 0.4400 (±.0197) 0.4441 (±.0156)
Laplacian 0.3545 (±.0168) 0.3750 (±.0227) 0.3800 (±.0276) 0.3803 (±.0197)
Curvature 0.3563 (±.0232) 0.3963 (±.0190) 0.4033 (±.0253) 0.4069 (±.0212)
In the following, we provide the steganalysis results for
the high capacity 3D steganography based on HPQ [9] and
its variants designed according to the approach from Section
4. The results are summarized in Table 1, in which HPQ rep-
resents the original method introduced in [9] that embeds in-
formation in all three coordinates of SCS with a payload rate
at 24 BPV, HPQ-PA represents the variant that embeds only
in the Polar Angle coordinate (ϕ) of SCS with a payload rate
at 8 BPV, HPQ-R represents the variant that embeds only in
the Radial coordinate of SCS. For HPQ-R, two payload rates
are considered, namely, 8 BPV and 24 BPV, corresponding
to different sub-intervals s = 28 and s = 224. In all these
methods, the interval parameter is set as ∆ = 10−7.
During the testing, we consider the features from the
LFS52 steaganalytic feature set in order to observe the in-
fluence of embedding in different coordinates of SCS on
the steganlytic features. The “Dihedral Angle” represents
the 4-dimensional feature subset corresponding to the dihe-
dral angles in the 3D objects. The “Laplacian” represents
the 16-dimensional feature subset corresponding to the ver-
tex position and norm in the Laplacian coordinate system.
The “Curvature” represents the 8-dimensional feature subset
corresponding to the curvature information of the vertex as
in [11]. After comparing the steganalysis results for HPQ,
HPQ-PA and HPQ-R, it is obvious that by embedding only
in the radial coordinate of SCS increases the steganography’s
resistance to steganalysis to the largest extent, representing
an increase of more than 12% in the detection error. The di-
hedral angle features are very effective when detecting HPQ,
but they are almost useless when detecting HPQ-R, which
implies that the dihedral angles in 3D objects are quite well
preserved when embedding only in the radial coordinate.
Furthermore, even when the payload is tripled for HPQ-R,
its resistance to steganalysis is only about 0.3% lower than
embedding at the payload rate of 8 BPV.
We also compared the proposed steganography, HPQ-R,
to several other 3D information hiding algorithms, namely,
Multi-Layer Steganography (MLS) [6], the watermarking
algorithm that modifies the Mean of the distribution of the
vertices’ Radial distances in the Spherical coordinate sys-
tem (MRS) [3], Steganalysis-Resistant Watermarking (SRW)
[19], and the original version of HPQ [9], with respect to the
resistance to the steganalysis. The number of embedding lay-
ers is considered as 10 and the number of intervals is chosen
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Fig. 3. Detection errors for the steganalysis of several infor-
mation embedding algorithms in 3D objects when using the
LFS52 feature set for training of the steganalyzers.
as 104 in MLS [6] whose payload rate is nearly 10 BPV. The
payload embedded in MRS [3] is 64 bits and the watermark-
ing strength is 0.04. The parameter K in SRW [19] is set to
128, while the algorithm’s upper bound for the embedding
capacity is ⌊(K − 2)/2⌋ bits. The final detection errors of
the five information hiding algorithms when using LFS52
for steganalysis are shown in Figure 3. It can be observed
that the proposed steganoraphy, HPQ-R, has the strongest
resistance to steganalysis when using the LFS52 to train the
steganalyzers, providing a reduction of 9-15% in the ability
of the steganalyzers to detect the hidden information.
6. CONCLUSION
The contribution of the paper is a rethinking of the high capac-
ity 3D steganography based on the Hamiltonian path quanti-
zation, in order to improve its resistance to steganalysis. We
analyze the influence of the interval parameter and the num-
ber of sub-intervals with respect to the displacement of the
vertex. It is also pointed out that by embedding in the ra-
dial coordinate of the spherical coordinate system we achieve
lower distortions in the steganalytic features when compared
to embedding in the angle coordinates. The experimental re-
sults assess these ideas by testing the proposed 3D steganog-
raphy with the steganalyzers trained with the steganalytic fea-
ture set, LFS52. By increasing the resistance to 3D steganaly-
sis we increase the protection of the information stored in 3D
objects.
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